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FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 15 SPRING 1987 NUMBER 1
A SPECIALIZED COURT FOR SOCIAL SECURITY? A
CRITIQUE OF RECENT PROPOSALS
ROBERT E. RAINS*
In this Article Professor Rains evaluates the recent proposals for
the creation of a Social Security Court. He evaluates the ex-
isting administrative and judicial system for the review of social
security claims in light of recent problems. Finally, Professor
Rains suggests that many of the present difficulties with the sys-
tem can be solved by reform of the Social Security Administra-
tion's review process rather than creation of an Article I court.
T HREE proposals have been made that would create a Social
Security Court to hear appeals from Social Security claimants.
House of Representatives bills 44191 and 46472 were placed before
Congress in 1986. The third proposal is a draft bill on which the
United States Department of Justice is working.3 The concept of
such a court is favored by the Secretary of Health and Human Ser-
vices, Dr. Otis R. Bowen.4 The Justice Department draft was de-
scribed in a February 1986 letter by Secretary Bowen to the Office
of Management and Budget, but the bill itself is not yet publicly
available.
On March 9, 1986, when knowledge of the draft legislation was
disseminated, the Reagan Administration publicly articulated sup-
port for the "concept" of a Social Security Court.6 Within ten days,
* Assistant Professor of Law and Supervisor of the Disability Law Clinic, The Dickinson
School of Law. J.D., 1974, Harvard Law School.
1. H.R. 4419, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (introduced by Rep. Archer)[hereinafter H.R.
4419].
2. H.R. 4647, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986) (introduced by Rep. Tauke)[hereinafter H.R.
4647].
3. Letter from Dr. Otis R. Bowen, Sec., Dept. of Health and Human Servs., to James C.
Miller, III, Director, Office of Management and Budget (Feb. 4, 1986) (on file, Florida State
University Law Review)[hereinafter Bowen letter].
4. Id.
5. New Court Sought For Benefit Cases, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1986, at IA, col. 5. The
concept of a specialized court for Social Security disability cases recently has received
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the first of two bills proposing the removal of Social Security cases
from judicial review in federal district court and placing it in an
Article I Social Security Court was introduced in the House of
Representatives.6 These bills, H.R. 4419 and H.R. 4647, therefore
may be viewed as trial balloons or stalking horses for the
Administration.
Currently, the Social Security Act 7 provides that an individual
who is aggrieved by a final decision of the Secretary of Health and
Human Services' may bring an action within sixty days' in the dis-
trict court of the United States for the judicial district in which
the plaintiff resides.10 Appeals from final district court decisions
are heard by the United States Court of Appeals for that circuit."
Decisions of the circuit courts may be reviewed by the United
States Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari. 2
favorable attention by Justice Scalia in an address at the ABA Midyear Meeting in New
Orleans. Hengstler, Scalia Seeks Court Changes, A.B.A. J., April 1, 1987, at 20. As this arti-
cle went to press, Representative Archer reintroduced his bill as H.R. 2117 in the 100th
Congress. The text of H.R. 2117 is not yet available to the author. See 1380 UNEMPLOYMENT
INS. REP. WITH SOCIAL SECURITY 1-2, May 5, 1986.
6. H.R. 4419, supra note 1; H.R. 4647, supra note 2.
7. Popularly known as the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI)
Amendments of 1965, 42 U.S.C. §§ 401-433 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
8. 42 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1982)(formerly the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare).
Department of Education Organization Act, Pub. L. No. 96-88, § 509(b), 93 Stat. 668, 695
(1979)(codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 3508(b) (1982)).
9. The statute provides that a civil action must be commenced "within sixty days after
the mailing to [plaintiff] of notice of such decision." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982). However, the
standard denial letter from the Social Security Administation reads:
If you desire a court review of the Administrative Law Judge's decision, you
may commence a civil action in the United States District Court in the judicial
district in which you reside within sixty (60) days from the date of the receipt of
this letter. It will be presumed that this letter is received within five (5) days after
the date shown above unless a reasonable showing is otherwise made.
Letter from John W. Wojciechowski to Social Security claimant denying review of Adminis-
trative Law Judge's decision (Aug. 19, 1986) (on file, Florida State University Law Review).
Consider also FED. R. Civ. P. 6(e):
(e) ADDITIONAL TIME AFTER SERVICE BY MAIL. Whenever a party has
the right or is required to do some act or take some proceedings within a pre-
scribed period after the service of a notice or other paper upon him and the notice
or paper is served upon him by mail, 3 days shall be added to the prescribed
period.
10. Jurisdiction also lies where the plaintiff "has his principal place of business, or, if he
does not reside or have his principal place of business within any such judicial district, in
the United States District Court for the District of Columbia." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (1982).
11. \28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1982 & Supp. III 1985). The United States Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit has separate jurisdictional bases, which are discussed infra note 169 and
accompanying text.
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) (1982).
SOCIAL SECURITY COURT
The proposals would remove all or almost all13 Social Security
appeals from the federal district courts and vest them in a new
Social Security Court."1 The judges of this Social Security Court
would not be article III judges15 entitled to "hold their Offices dur-
ing good Behaviour."' 6 Rather, the judges of the Social Security
Court would be article I1 judges serving fixed terms of ten years.' 8
Appeals from the Social Security Court would lie in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.'9
Four days prior to the introduction of H.R. 4419, forty-one
members of the House of Representatives introduced a resolution
strongly disapproving any proposal to establish a Social Security
Court.2 0 Representative Peter Rodino, chairman of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, published an open letter to the Editor
of the New York Times condemning the proposed Social Security
Court.2' The American Bar Association's House of Delegates
passed a resolution at its August 1986 meeting opposing the
proposal.22
One cannot fully appreciate the concerns about establishing an
article I Social Security Court without understanding the adminis-
trative system it would review and that system's recent history.
Thus, the author in this Article looks at the existing Social Secur-
ity determination system, with an overview of some of its difficul-
ties and malfunctions, particularly those occurring during this ad-
ministration. The author then describes the Social Security Court
proposals, the justifications for those proposals, and finally criti-
ques the proposals.
13. H.R. 4419, supra note 1, at tit. II, § 202, would vest all appeals in the Social Security
Court. H.R. 4647, supra note 2, at tit. II, § 2002, would retain district court review of consti-
tutional claims and claims that regulations are invalid under the statute.
14. H.R. 4419, supra note 1, at tit. II, §§ 201-02; H.R. 4647, supra note 2, at tit. II, §
2001.
15. U.S. CONST. art. III.
16. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. Article III judges may only be removed upon impeachment
by the House of Representatives (U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5) and trial by the Senate (U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6).
17. U.S. CONST. art. I., § 8, cl. 9.
18. H.R. 4419, supra note 1, at tit. II, § 202(a); H.R. 4647, supra note 2, at tit. II, § 2001.
19. H.R. 4419, supra note 1, at tit. II, § 202; H.R. 4647, supra note 2, at tit. II, § 2002.
20. H.R. Res. 400, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
21. Rodino, New Judicial Hurdle for the Handicapped, N.Y. Times, Mar. 26, 1986, at
A22, col. 1.
22. 8 NAT'L. ORG. OF Soc. SEC. CLAIMANT'S Raps. Soc. SEC. F., Aug. 1986, at 1.
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I. THE CURRENT SYSTEM
"The camel is a horse designed by a committee." - anon.
When President Reagan telephoned artificial heart recipient
William J. Schroeder in December 1984 to wish him well, Mr.
Schroeder complained that he was getting the "runaround" from
the Social Security Administration on his claim for disability bene-
fits filed that March.2 3 The next day, government officials delivered
a Social Security check to Mr. Schroeder's hospital room.24 Mr.
Schroeder's predicament is symptomatic of problems within the
administrative system. However, most claimants do not have the
benefit of the publicity attendant to being a pioneer artificial heart
recipient nor of the sympathetic ear of the President of the United
States.
A. Administrative Review Process
An applicant for Social Security benefits enters a multi-tiered
administrative process.25 The Social Security Act dictates that "the
Secretary [of Health and Human Services] is directed to make
findings of fact, and decisions as to the rights of any individual
applying for a payment under [Subchapter II - Federal Old-Age,
Survivors, and Disability Insurance Benefits] .'26 The first level of
the administrative process is an initial determination of eligibility,
usually by a state agency under contract to the Secretary, with no-
tice of the decision coming from the Social Security Administra-
tion (SSA).2 7 The claimant who receives an unfavorable or only
partially favorable decision on the initial determination may file
23. Heart Patient Goes to Top With Problem on Pension, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1984, at
Al, col. 1.
24. Benefits Follow Reagan's Call, N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1984, at B13, col. 1.
25. The administrative process covers, with certain variations, many federal programs
including claims for Social Security Disability Insurance, child's, widow's or widower's insur-
ance benefits, Supplemental Security Income (SSI) and Medicare. Numerous sub-issues
such as insured status, overpayment, waiver of recovery of overpayment, paternity, and even
common-law marriage may be adjudicated through this administrative process. See gener-
ally 42 U.S.C. §§ 402, 405 (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985). Similar procedures apply to Supple-
mental Security Income claims by virtue of 42 U.S.C. § 1383(d)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 421 (1982 & Supp. III 1985); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1503, 416.903 (1986). The
problems with the system in recent years have led to battles between the Secretary and
certain state agencies the discussion of which is beyond the scope of this article. See New
Court Sought For Benefit Cases, N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1986, at Al, col. 5.
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for "reconsideration," the second level of administrative decision-
making. 28 Reconsideration is usually performed by the state agency
that made the initial determination.2
If dissatisfied with the results of reconsideration, the claimant
may obtain a hearing before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ)
of the Social Security Administration." The claimant may appear
at the hearing with or without witnesses and present oral testi-
mony to supplement the file of medical, vocational and other ex-
hibits.3 1 Testimony is taken under oath, and a complete record is
made. 2 This ALJ hearing constitutes the third level of administra-
tive decisionmaking."
Claimants dissatisfied with the result of the ALJ hearing may
request the fourth level of administrative decisionmaking, review
by the Appeals Council." The Appeals Council need not wait for a
claimant to request review, and may initiate review of any ALJ
decision, even one which is favorable to the claimant, on its own
motion.38 There is limited opportunity for a personal appearance
of the claimant or his representative before the Appeals Council
which is located in Arlington, Virginia. The Appeals Council is the
final level of administrative review.36
B. Judicial Review Process
The decision of the Appeals Counci 37 is the final administrative
decision of the Secretary." The aggrieved claimant may then ap-
peal this decision to the federal district court where the claimant
28. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.907, 416.1407 (1986).
29. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(2)(C) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)(making provisions for reconsid-
eration by the state agency and the Secretary).
30. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(b)(1), 1383(c)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.929,
416.1429 (1986).
31. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.950, 416.1450 (1986).
32. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.951, 416.1451 (1986).
33. Because the initial determination and reconsideration are usually performed by the
state agency, the ALJ hearing is usually the first level of decisionmaking by the Social Se-
curity Administration.
34. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.967, 416.1467 (1986).
35. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.969, 416.1469 (1986).
36. Because the Appeals Council may remand to the ALJ, a case may quite possibly go
through more than four administrative levels before reaching federal district court.
37. In situations where the Appeals Council denies review, the ALJ's decision becomes
the Secretary's final decision. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.967, 416.1467 (1986).
38. There is an "expedited appeals process" where inter alia the claimant and the Secre-
tary agree that the only factor preventing a favorable decision is a provision in the law that
the claimant believes is unconstitutional. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.924, 416.1424 (1986).
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resides. 9 The district court reviews the record to determine
whether the Secretary's decision is supported by "substantial evi-
dence. ' '4 0 Applying this test to Social Security appeals, the Su-
preme Court has stated that substantial evidence is "more than a
mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."'1 The
definition has been applied to other statutory situations.42
Describing the administrative process, Justice Powell has written
rather glowingly: "[T]o facilitate the orderly and sympathetic ad-
ministration of the disability program of Title II, the Secretary
and Congress have established an unusually protective four-step
process for the review and adjudication of disputed claims."' 3
While some aspects of the process may indeed be protective of
claimants, all too often claimants find themselves mired in an ad-
ministrative morass." Ironically, Justice Powell's description came
in a challenge to admitted unreasonable delays in the process.' 5
While the claimant is subject to a strict sixty day limit to appeal
each adverse determination to the next level, the Secretary is not
bound to render decisions at any level within any specific time.4 ,
Justice Powell noted that, "the legislative history makes clear that
Congress [is] fully aware of the serious delays in resolution of disa-
bility claims.' 47 Largely because Congress had failed to impose
time limitations on the Secretary, the Court overturned an order of
the Second Circuit enjoining the Secretary to adjudicate all future
39. 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g), 1383(c)(3) (1982 & Supp. III 1985); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.981,
416.1481 (1986).
40. Id.
41. Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971).
.42. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938); Consolo v. Federal
Maritime Comm'n, 383 U.S. 607, 619-20 (1966); Universal Camera Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S.
474, 477 (1951); NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939).
43. Heckler v. Day, 467 U.S. 104, 106 (1984).
44. One case handled by the author lasted eight years from application to payment.
Many practitioners, including the author, have experienced the distress of having the client
die of the claimed disease before the administrative process was completed.
45. Justice Powell noted:
Nor does (the Secretary) challenge the District Court's determination that the de-
lays encountered in the cases of plaintiffs Day and Maurais violated that require-
ment ....
Nor do we understand the Secretary to dispute the District Court's determina-
tion that the 27 sample cases it studied evidenced statutory violations of the rea-
sonableness requirement.
Day, 467 U.S. at 111 n.15.
46. Id. at 110, 111.
47. Id.
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disability claims according to judicially established deadlines and
to pay interim benefits in all cases of noncompliance with those
deadlines.48
II. RECENT PROBLEMS
Exacerbating the delays inherent in any four-tier, state/federal
system has been the aggressive process of continuing disability re-
views of current recipients, particularly in 1981 through 1984. The
Social Security Disability Amendments of 19804e required the Sec-
retary to review recipients of Social Security disability insurance
benefits at least once every three years unless a finding had been
made that the disability was permanent. The SSA spurred by this
Congressional prod to review claimants, and finding it consistent
with its own budgetary interests, undertook a massive purge of the
disability rolls. The toll in human terms ultimately was well re-
ported in the media.50 Horror stories abounded of the most seri-
ously ill persons being found no longer disabled. During the first
two years of this purge, many of these individuals lost their
monthly benefit checks while they appealed their disability status,
even though they ultimately prevailed on their claims.51
From a systems standpoint, the Secretary's equating of a direc-
tion to review with a mandate to purge created new pressures on
the already heavily burdened adjudicatory systems at all levels. In
the 1983 fiscal year, the Office of Hearings and Appeals received
48. Id.
49. Pub. L. No. 96-265, § 311, 94 Stat. 441, 461 (1980) (codified as amended 42 U.S.C. §
421(i) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)).
50. See, e.g., Judge Criticizes U.S. Agency on Denial of Benefits, N.Y. Times, June 8,
1984, at B5, col. 1 (brain damaged veteran who had been shot in head); Amidei, 'Getting
Tough' with People's Lives: Budget Cutting Mania Led to Horror Stories by the Disabled,
L.A. Times, Sept. 21, 1984, Part II at 5, col. 3. The author of this Article represented a
mentally disabled individual who, because he had been involuntarily committed to a mental
institution and because his mail was not forwarded, did not timely receive his notice from
the Social Security Administration that he was no longer disabled.
51. When the purge began, the Social Security Act did not provide for continued bene-
fits pending a hearing. This denial of continued benefits was upheld by the Supreme Court
in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In January 1983, in response to stories of
improper terminations and resulting financial hardship, Congress enacted The Act of Jan.
12, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-455, § 2, 96 Stat. 2497-2499 (1983) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 423(g)(1) (1982 & Supp. III 1985)), which temporarily allowed terminated disability
recipients to opt to continue receiving benefits while on appeal pending an ALJ decision. By
its terms, this provision expired in June 1984. The Social Security Disability Benefits Re-
form Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-460, § 7, 98 Stat. 1794, 1803 (1984) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C. (1982 & Supp. III 1985)), extended this provision until June
1988.
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over 134,000 requests for hearings in Continuing Disability Review
(CDR) cases, accounting for 36.4% of the requests received.5 2 The
SSA's own reinstatement statistics bear witness to an unconsciona-
bly high rate of wrongful terminations during this period. By
March 1984, federal officials were reporting that over 470,000 peo-
ple had been removed from the disability rolls in the preceding
three years, 160,000 had already been reinstated after appeals, and
another 120,000 cases were pending.58 Suddenly, the administrative
system had to cope with the influx of hundreds of thousands of
terminated disability recipients appealing their cases.
A. Nonacquiescence
Further confusion has been caused by the Reagan Administra-
tion's aggressive use of the policy of "nonacquiescence.' '" Nonac-
quiescence as practiced by the SSA is the policy of not applying
the rule of law enunciated by a circuit court of appeals to other
claimants who reside within that circuit.55
The SSA has adopted two forms of nonacquiescence.5 6 The first
and most obvious form is the issuance of a formal Social Security
Ruling directing agency personnel, including ALJs and employees
of the state agencies, not to follow a specific circuit court deci-
sion. A variation involves Social Security Rulings instructing
ALJs and the Appeals Council as to the meaning of circuit court
decisions with which the SSA does not acquiesce. While the ALJs
and Appeals Council apply the SSA's interpretation of these deci-
52. Operational Report of the Office of Hearings and Appeals, Sept. 30, 1983, S.S.A.
Pub. No. 70-032 (Jan. 1984), as reprinted in 6 NAT'L ORG. OF Soc. SEC. CLAIMANT'S REPS.
Soc. SEC. F., May 1984, at 13.
53. Reagan Reported Prepared to Stop Cuts in Disability, N.Y. Times, March 24, 1984,
at Al, col. 6.
54. Stieberger v. Heckler, 615 F. Supp. 1315, 1342-43 (S.D. N.Y. 1985), vacated sub nom.
Stieberger v. Heckler, 801 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1986).
55. A full critique of nonacquiescence is beyond the scope of this article. See Fallon,
Social Security and Legal Precedent, 89 CASE & COM., Mar.-Apr. 1984, at 3 [hereinafter
Fallon]; Comment, Social Security Continuing Disability Reviews And The Practice Of
Nonacquiescene, 16 CUMB. L. REV. 111 (1985)[hereinafter Disability Reviews]; Williams,
The Social Security Administration's Policy of Nonacquiescence, 12 N. Ky. L. REV. 253
(1985).
56. Stieberger, 801 F.2d at 32-33. See, e.g., Douglas v. Schweiker, 734 F.2d 399 (8th Cir.
1984); Lopez v. Heckler, 572 F. Supp. 26 (C.D. Cal. 1983), afl'd in part, rev'd in part, 725
F.2d 1489 (9th Cir.), vacated, 469 U.S. 1082 (1984); Fallon, supra note 55, at 4.
57. See Schisler v. Heckler, 787 F.2d 76, 82 (2d Cir. 1986). For an example of a nonac-
quiescence ruling see SSR-82-49c C.Ed. (1982) in which the SSA nonacquiesced in Patti v.
Schweiker, 669 F.2d 582 (9th Cir. 1982).
[Vol. 15:1
SOCIAL SECURITY COURT
sions, the state agencies would not even attempt to implement the
decisions. 8
The most pernicious variation of nonacquiescence is silence.
Rather than issue a public ruling of nonacquiescence, the adminis-
tration simply disregards the holding of a case except as applied to
the named plaintiff.59 Consider, for example, a situation in which
the SSA nonacquiesced in a series of circuit court decisions gov-
erning the standards to be employed in its continuing disability
reviews.0 The state agency, ALJs6  and Appeals Council would
continue to apply the invalidated provision to claimants, including
those who reside within the circuit, to deny them disability bene-
fits. On appeal, of course, the district court applied the circuit pre-
cedent and reversed or remanded. However, since only a small per-
centage of claimants pursue their cases into the federal court
system, many cases are never adjudicated under the relevant pre-
cedential decisions.
As with continuing disability reviews, the SSA policy of nonac-
quiescence is not a creation of the Reagan Administration, but
under that administration it has been greatly expanded.2 Earlier
rulings were extremely rare and usually concerned rather limited
issues.68
For many claimants nonacquiescence creates a dual system of
adjudication in which their claim will be denied at all four admin-
istrative levels and granted on appeal to federal court, if they have
the sophistication and resources to obtain judicial review. A useful
analogy for understanding the application of nonacquiescence to a
particular claimant would be a traffic system where the maximum
legal speed is forty-five miles per hour to a policeman and in traffic
court but fifty-five miles per hour on appeal to county court. A
duty-bound policeman arrests the motorist who is doing fifty miles
per hour on the highway. The motorist is taken to traffic court,
58. See Stieberger, 801 F.2d at 33, 37. For an example of an SSA ruling instructing ALJs
and the Appeals Council see Soc. Sec. Admin. Interim Circular No. 185, June 3, 1985, re-
printed in Stieberger, 615 F. Supp. at 1403.
59. Fallon, supra note 55, at 4; see also Hyatt v. Heckler, 807 F.2d 376, 380-81 (4th Cir.
1986).
60. Consider the ethical/moral dilemma of the ALJ, who is both an attorney and officer
of the court, and who is supposed to deny benefits based upon a regulation that he knows a
governing court has invalidated. See Matthew 6:24; see also Stieberger, 615 F. Supp. at
1315, 1352 n.25.
61. Fallon, supra note 55, at 4.
62. Id. at 6.
63. Id.
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found guilty of exceeding the speed limit, and his driver license is
suspended. Many months or a year or two later, the reviewing
county court reverses, finding that he was driving within the speed
limit. His conviction is overturned and his license is ordered rein-
stated. To make the analogy complete, it takes the bureaucracy
several more months to return the driver license. Needless to say,
our unhappy motorist may have suffered rather severe conse-
quences from his license suspension. Of course, most terminated
disability recipients have lost something more vital than their
driver licenses: their sole source of income.
The impacts of nonacquiescence on the adjudicatory system
have been manifold. This dual system of adjudication increases
both the number of cases appealed to federal court and the rever-
sal and remand rates.64 Nonacquiescence has been challenged di-
rectly in complex class action litigation in the courts.65
B. Bowen v. City of New York
Not only has the SSA failed to follow circuit court precedent, it
has also been found to have ignored its own regulations in denying
disability benefits. One would expect in a system of this size cases
in which courts find that the agency violated its regulations. How-
ever, in Bowen v. City of New York," the SSA was found to have
adopted a systematic, covert policy of avoiding its regulatory se-
quential evaluation process in adjudicating claims of disability
based upon mental impairment.
In the sequential evaluation process, at each of the four adminis-
trative levels, each claim is evaluated through a flow chart of up to
five steps. The first inquiry is to determine whether the individual
is doing "substantial gainful activity." If so, he is not disabled, and
the inquiry ends. If not, the adjudicator proceeds to the second
consideration, whether the individual suffers from a severe impair-
ment that meets the durational requirements. If not, he is not dis-
abled. If so, the adjudicator proceeds to the third consideration: a
determination of whether the individual has an impairment that
meets or equals one on the "Listing of Impairments." If so, he is
disabled. If not, the adjudicator is mandated to proceed to the
64. Disability Reviews, supra note 55, at 111.
65. Stieberger v. Heckler, 801 F.2d 29, 30-31 (2d Cir. 1986).
66. 106 S. Ct. 2022 (1986). See also Mental Health Ass'n v. Schweiker, 554 F. Supp. 157
(D. Minn. 1982), aff'd in part and modified in part, 720 F.2d 965 (8th Cir. 1983) (order
granting a preliminary injunction).
[Vol. 15:1
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fourth consideration: whether, the individual can return to past
relevant work. If he can, he is not disabled. If not, the adjudicator
must proceed to the final consideration: whether the individual can
do alternative work.6
7
From 1978 to 1983, the SSA was found to have a "fixed clandes-
tine policy against those with mental illness" in violation of the
sequential evaluation process.8 Where such claimants did not
meet the Listings, the SSA did not proceed to step four in the
evaluation, but instead routinely denied their claims.9 The Court
unanimously upheld relief for mentally disabled class members, in-
cluding those who had failed to exhaust their administrative reme-
dies and those who had failed to seek timely judicial review. 70 The
SSA was ordered "to reopen the decisions denying or terminating
benefits and to redetermine eligibility. 7' Although it is too early
to quantify the impact of the Supreme Court's affirmance, there is
no doubt that the administrative system will suffer a significant
additional burden in handling these reopened cases. Moreover, this
is not the only ruling by which a court has ordered SSA to reopen
numerous cases because of surreptitiously adopted "illegal stan-
dards for denying disability benefits. 7 2
In City of New York, the Court noted the trial court's finding,
not challenged by SSA on appeal, that: "SSA relied on bureau-
cratic instructions rather than individual assessments and over-
ruled the medical opinions of its own consulting physicians that
many of those whose claims they were instructed to deny could
not, in fact, work."'73 The trial court concluded that "the resulting
supremacy of bureaucracy over professional medical judgments
67. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520 (1986). The second step of this evaluation process currently is
being challenged. The Supreme Court has granted certiorari to hear the challenge in Bowen
v. Yuckert, 106 S. Ct. 1967 (1986).
68. City of New York, 106 S. Ct. at 2027.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 2031-33.
71. Id. at 2028.
72. See, e.g., Kuehner v. Heckler, 778 F.2d 152, 161 (3rd Cir. 1985)(approved reopening
of closed cases of terminated class members whose benefits were cut off after June 1, 1976);
W.C. v. Heckler, 629 F. Supp. 791 (W.D. Wash. 1986), aff'd sub nom., W.C. v. Bowen, 807
F.2d 1502 (9th Cir. 1987) (reopening cases tainted by the Bellmon Review Process).
73. "Physicians were pressured to reach 'conclusions' contrary to their own professional
beliefs in cases where they felt, at the very least, that additional evidence needed to be
gathered in the form of a realistic work assessment." City of New York, 106 S. Ct. at 2027
n.5.
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and the flaunting of published, objective standards is contrary to
the spirit and letter of the Social Security Act."'
C. Bellmon Review Program
Sadly, such pressures by the SSA during the Reagan Adminis-
tration have not been limited to physicians. As it had done with
the Continuing Disability Review program, the SSA responded to
another Congressional mandate to tighten procedure and cen-
strued it to pressure ALJs to deny benefits. The Bellmon Amend-
ment to the Social Security Disability Amendments of 198075 re-
quired the Secretary to implement a program of reviewing ALJs'
decisions for accuracy and reporting back to the Congress on his
progress. The SSA's Bellmon Review Program initially targeted for
review only ALJs with high allowance rates, that is, those ALJs
who awarded benefits at a rate higher than average. 7 Those ALJs
were targeted for possible "counseling," "behavioral modification"
and "other steps."'7 Although the justification for the program was
to seek consistency in ALJ decisionmaking, no similar pressure was
exerted on ALJs having denial rates substantially above the na-
tional average.7 8 The reason given for focusing exclusively on high
allowance ALJs was that ALJs denying benefits were already sub-
ject to review by claimants appealing their decisions. 79 However,
this disregards that a very substantial number of claimants who
are denied at the ALJ level never take an appeal.8 0 Many ALJs
complained that pressure exerted on high allowance ALJs com-
pelled ALJs to deny benefits.
Citing these and other abuses, the Association of Administrative
Law Judges sued the Secretary and high SSA officials in the Dis-
trict Court for the District of Columbia to enjoin the Bellmon Re-
74. Id.
75. Pub. L. No. 96-265, § 304(g), 94 Stat. 441, 456 (1980) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 421 note (1982). The Bellmon Amendment is named in honor of Senator Henry
Bellmon, the bill's driving force in the Senate. See W.C., 629 F. Supp. at 793 n.1.
76. Association of Admin. Law Judges v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132,1134 (D.D.C. 1984).
See also W.C. v. Heckler, 629 F. Supp. 791 (W.D. Wash. 1986), aff'd sub nom. W.C. v.
Bowen, 807 F.2d 1502 (9th Cir. 1987).
77. Association of Admin. Law Judges, 594 F. Supp. at 1143.
78. Id. at 1134.
79. Id.
80. In Fiscal Year 1985, 39% of claimants denied at the AIJ level did not appeal to the
Appeals Council. HOUSE WAYS AND MEANS COMM., 99TH CONG., 2D SESS., BACKGROUND
MATERIALS AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF THE COMMITTEE ON WAYS
AND MEANS 14 (Comm. Print 1986), reprinted in 8 NAT'L. ORG. SOC. SEC. CLAIMANT'S REP.
SOC. SEC. F., April 1986 at 7.
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view Program. The court denied relief on the ground that the de-
fendants had "shifted their focus," making injunctive relief
unnecessary "at this time." 81 However, after reviewing the evi-
dence, the court made several important findings of fact and con-
clusions of law. The court found no authority in the Bellmon
Amendment or its legislative history for the SSA to target high
allowance ALJs for review, counseling and possible disciplinary ac-
tion.8 2 The court found persuasive evidence that the SSA "retained
an unjustifiable preoccupation with allowance rates" which put
"pressure [on ALJs] to issue fewer allowance decisions."83 Thus
"the Bellmon Review Program created an untenable atmosphere of
tension and unfairness which violated the spirit of the APA, if no
specific provision thereof. 8 4 The court also found that the SSA
ignored the "decisional independence" afforded to ALJs by the
Administrative Procedure Act by "the injudicious use of phrases
such as 'targeting', 'goals' and 'behavior modification' [which]
could have tended to corrupt the ability of administrative law
judges to exercise that independence in the vital cases that they
decide. '85
D. The Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act Of 1984
Concerned about problems within the administrative system,
Congress enacted the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform
Act of 1984 (SSDBRA).8 The House Committee on Ways and
Means found three areas where reform appeared necessary:
[I]n the standards for determining eligibility for disability bene-
fits, both for new applicants and more particularly for current
beneficiaries being reviewed; in the structure of the administra-
tive process itself; and in the way in which the Social Security
Adminstration [sic] makes disability policy, both on its own initi-
ative and in conjunction with rulings of the Federal courts.87
81. Association of Admin. Law Judges v. Heckler, 594 F. Supp. 1132, 1143 (D.D.C. 1984).
82. Id. at 1141-43.
83. Id. at 1142-43.
84. Id. The "APA" is the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551-559 (1982).
85. Id.
86. Pub. L. No. 98-460, 98 Stat. 1794 (1984) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
42 U.S.C. (Supp. III 1985).
87. HousE CoMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS, H.R. REP. No. 618, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, re-
printed in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3038-39.
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The enacted version of SSDBRA addresses these critical areas, and
others, with varying degrees of precision.
SSDBRA provides a statutory standard of review for termina-
tion of disability benefits which requires substantial evidence ei-
ther of the recipient's medical improvement or of one of several
other medical or vocational scenarios."' These provisions rejected
the SSA's policy of evaluating continuing disability review (CDR)
cases with the same standard as new applications and judging
them on a "current evidence" of disability standard. 89 SSDBRA or-
dered the courts to remand pending CDR termination cases to the
SSA for redetermination under the new standards.90 Former recipi-
ents whose cases were remanded were authorized to elect to receive
benefits until a new initial redetermination was made. 91 Although
the Act mandated the SSA to prescribe implementing new regula-
tions no later than 180 days after the date of enactment, they were
not promulgated until fourteen months later, in December 1985.9"
Processing of affected individuals is ongoing-another burden on
the administrative system that the SSA largely brought upon
itself.
The Act also provided explicit language relating to the evalua-
tion of claims of disability based on pain or other subjective symp-
toms, an area of frequent conflict between SSA and the courts.93
The Act overruled the SSA's refusal to consider any impairment
unless it is itself "severe" and mandated that the combined effect
of all of the claimant's impairments should be considered.9 4 In ad-
dition, the Act provided for a moratorium on mental impairment
reviews until the SSA revised the criteria embodied under "Mental
Disorders" in the Listing of Impairments." Finally, the Act ex-
88. Pub. L. No. 98-460, § 2(a), 98 Stat. 1794 (1984) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
423(f) (Supp. III 1985)).
89. Kuehner, 778 F.2d 152, 154-155 (3 Cir. 1985).
90. Pub. L. No. 98-460, § 2(d)(3), 98 Stat. 1794, 1798 (1984) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 423 (Supp. III 1985)).
91. Pub. L. No. 98-460, § 2(e), 98 Stat. 1794, 1798-99 (1984) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 423 (Supp. III 1985)).
92. 50 Fed. Reg. 50,130 (1985)(codified at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1588-.1598 (1986).
93. Pub. L. No. 98-460, § 3, 98 Stat. 1794, 1799-1800 (1984) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A) (Supp. III 1985)). See, e.g., Green v. Schweiker, 749 F.2d 1066 (3d Cir.
1984).
94. Pub. L. No. 98-460(a)(1), § 4, 98 Stat. 1794, 1800 (1984) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(C) (Supp. III 1985)).
95. Pub. L. No. 98-460, § 5(a), 98 Stat. 1794, 1801 (1984) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. § 421 note (Supp. III 1985)). Again SSA did not comply with the 120-day deadline
established by Congress for issuing the new criteria. The new regulations were not promul-
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tended the temporary policy of allowing a recipient found to be no
longer disabled to continue receiving benefits pending a hearing
decision."
Although SSDBRA is reform legislation aimed at curing many of
the deficiencies described above, it is not a panacea. Some areas
were left vague, most were left for interpretation by the SSA, and
the issue of nonacquiescence was not resolved. Unable to grapple
fully with evaluation of pain as a disability, the Act mandated the
Secretary to establish a Commission on the Evaluation of Pain to
study the issue and report back to Congress.9 7 Although both the
House Bill and the Senate amendment had spoken directly to the
policy of nonacquiescence," the final enacted version mandated
only that the Secretary establish "uniform standards" which shall
be applied at all levels of determinations, review and adjudica-
tion.99 The Joint Explanatory Statement of the Committee of Con-
ference noted that, in reaching this compromise, the conferees did
not intend to approve " 'non-acquiescence' by a federal agency to
an interpretation of a United States Circuit Court of Appeals as a
general practice."100 Thus, while SSDBRA offers the hope of real
improvements in the administrative adjudication process, it does
not solve all the problems, and it is too early to see its full impact,
particularly because of the SSA's slow implementation.
III. THE COURT PROPOSALS
Against this background of administrative and other difficulties,
proposals to create a Social Security Court are resurfacing." 1 The
gated until August 28, 1985. 50 Fed. Reg. 35,065 (1985) (codified at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)
(1986)).
96. Pub. L. No. 98-460, § 7, 98 Stat. 1794, 1803 (1984) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(g)(1) (Supp. III 1985)).
97. Pub. L. No. 98-460, § 3(b)(1), 98 Stat. 1794, 1799-1800 (1984) (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C, § 423 note (Supp. I1 1985)).
98. JOINT EXPLANATORY STATEMENT OF THE COMM. OF CONFERENCE, H.R. CONF. REP. No.
1039, 98th Cong., 2d Seas. 37, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS, 3080, 3095
[hereinafter CONFERENCE REPORT].
99. Pub. L. No. 98-460, § 10(a), 98 Stat. 1794, 1805 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §
421(k)(1) (Supp. III 1985)).
100. CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 98, at 37.
101. Similar proposals have been introduced in Congress as H.R. 8076, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1977); H.R. 3865, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981); H.R. 5700, 97th Cong. 2d Seas. (1982).
See Ogilvy, The Social Security Court Proposal: A Critique, 9 J. LEGIs. 229-30 (1982). In
1978, the National Center for Administrative Justice conducted a study funded by SSA. The
resulting book, J. MASHAW, C. GOETZ, F. GOODMAN, W. SCHWARTZ, P. VERKUIL & M. CARROW,
SOCIAL SECURITY HEARINGS AND APPEALS 146-150 (1978) [hereinafter CENTER REPORT] dis-
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two bills introduced in the 99th Congress and the draft Justice De-
partment bill have similarities and important differences.
A. H.R. 4419
The "Social Security Procedural Improvements Act of 1986,"
H.R. 4419, addresses both the administrative process and judicial
review. Title I would empower the Secretary to decide unilaterally
to take over a state agency's disability determination function and
to convert the state employees to employees of the United States
Department of Health and Human Services. 02 Title II would abol-
ish the fourth administrative step, the Appeals Council, but would
not make the ALJ's decision the final decision of the Secretary.'
Rather, the bill contemplates that the Secretary must issue a final
decision after the ALJ decision and provides for interim benefits
where the ALJ decision rules favorably and no final decision is is-
sued within ninety days.104 Just what entity within SSA would is-
sue this final decision is left unstated. Since the ALJ's decision is
not the final decision, the purpose for abolishing the Appeals Court
is unclear. It is worth noting that currently the Appeals Court is
not mandated by statute.
Title II would create a Social Security Court to hear appeals of
final administrative decisions.10 5 There would be twenty judges ap-
pointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate.01 Judges
would serve terms of ten years'07 and be subject to removal by the
President for specified cause after the opportunity for a hearing. 0 s
The chief judge would be empowered to appoint "commissioners"
who are "to proceed under such rules and regulations as may be
promulgated by the Court."10 9 The precise function of these com-
missioners is left unclear, but presumably they would perform a
function akin to that of United States Magistrates in federal dis-
trict court. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal
cusses creation of an Article I Social Security court and speaks favorably of such a court if it
had proper safeguards.
102. H.R. 4419, supra note 1, at tit. I, §§ 101, 102.
103. Id. at tit. If, § 203 (a).
104. Id. at tit. II, §§ 203 (b), (c).
105. Id. at tit. II, § 202.
106. Id. at tit. II, § 202(c)(1).
107. Id. at tit. II, § 202(c)(4).
108. Id. at tit. I, § 202(c)(5).
109. Id. at tit. II, § 202(e)(4).
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Circuit would have exclusive jurisdiction to hear appeals from the
Social Security Court.110
B. H.R. 4647
The "Social Security Reorganization Act of 1986," H.R. 4647,
likewise addresses both administrative procedures and judicial re-
view. Title I would establish the Social Security Administration as
an independent agency separate from the Department of Health
and Human Services and governed by a Social Security Board ap-
pointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate."' The
Board would in turn appoint a Commissioner of Social Security.1
Title III would make major changes in the administrative pro-
cess. A disability claimant or recipient "who makes a showing in
writing that his or her rights may be prejudiced by any decision
the Secretary has rendered" would be entitled to an evidentiary
hearing held by a "hearing officer employed in the Department of
Health and Human Services."' 3
There would be substantial limitations on the scope and manner
of the ALJ's review. The ALJ would review cases after the hearing
and then only if he first determines that the application for review
raises at least one of five enumerated issues." 4 Thus, the current
de novo ALJ hearing, the most favorable review step for claimants,
would be eliminated. The ALJ could not consider an objection
which has not been urged before the hearing officer below "unless
the failure or neglect to urge the objection is excused because of
extraordinary circumstances.' 15 It is left unclear exactly how the
110. Id. at tit. II, § 202(g).
111. H.R. 4647, supra note 2, at § 2, 1101-02 (1986). Granting SSA independent status
has been proposed in other legislation. See H.R. 5050, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., 132 CONG. REC.
H4,693 (daily ed. July 22, 1986), entitled "The Social Security Administrative and Invest-
ment Reform Act of 1986," which would establish the SSA as an independent agency. This
bill unanimously passed the House on July 22, 1986. 132 CONG. REC. H4,722 (daily ed. July
22, 1986).
112. H.R. 4647, supra note 2, at § 1102.
113. Id. at tit. III, § 3001-3002. Thus it appears that ALJs are not among the personnel
to be transferred from Health & Human Services to SSA under § 1104 of the bill.
114. Id. at tit. III, § 3002. These issues are:
(I) whether any finding or conclusion of material fact was not supported by
substantial evidence;
(II) whether a necessary legal conclusion was erroneous;
(III) whether the decision was contrary to law;
(IV) whether a substantial question of law is presented; or
(V) whether a prejudicial error of procedure was committed.
115. Id.
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frequently unrepresented claimant, in a supposedly nonadversarial
hearing, is supposed to urge these factual and legal objections to a
decision that is not yet issued at the time of the hearing. The ALJ
would not be empowered to hear additional evidence, but under
certain circumstances could order additional evidence to be taken
before the hearing officer and made a part of the record. " 6
Either party-the claimant or the Secretary-would be allowed
to appeal to an ALJ an adverse hearing decision.'1 7 However, if the
Secretary appeals a decision granting benefits and the ALJ has not
issued a decision within sixty days of the hearing officer's decision,
the Secretary would have to pay interim benefits to the
claimant.118
In short, the hearing officer would assume functions akin to
those performed by ALJs currently, and ALJs would assume func-
tions similar to those performed by the Appeals Council. The
ALJ's decision would "be binding on all parties, including the Sec-
retary," and would become the final decision of the Secretary."'
The Secretary generally could not on his own motion review an
ALJ decision favorable to a claimant.120 By implication, the Ap-
peals Council, as such, would cease to exist.
Section 2001 would establish a Social Security Court to hear
most appeals of final administrative decisions. 2' There would be
twenty judges appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate. 12 Judges would serve terms of ten years and be subject to
removal by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit for specified causes after the opportunity for a hearing. 23
Under Title II, the federal district courts would retain jurisdic-
tion over Social Security appeals in actions which present a claim
or cause of action arising under the Constitution, or a challenge to
the validity of a Social Security regulation. 12 " This residual juris-
diction in the district courts would be "subject to a stipulation"
between the parties that there is no dispute as to the material facts
of the case and that a statutory or regulatory provision is the only
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at tit. III, § 3003.
119. Id. at tit. 11I,§ 3002.
120. Id.
121. Id. at tit. 11, §§ 2001, 2002.
122. Id. at tit. I1, § 2001.
123. Id.
124. Id. at tit. II, § 2002.
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bar to the alleged claim. 12 5 Jurisdiction is unclear when the plain-
tiff alleges that only an illegal statute or regulation bars his recov-
ery but the Secretary refuses to so stipulate. It appears that the
Secretary could keep all cases out of district court by such a
refusal.
Title II explicitly authorizes either the Secretary or the Social
Security Board to file an appeal of a final decision favorable to a
claimant in the Social Security Court.126 Thus, although the ALJ's
decision would be binding on the Secretary, he could appeal it.
However, if the Secretary appeals an ALJ decision that is
favorable to the claimant and if the Social Security Court does not
render final judgment within sixty days of the ALJ decision, the
Secretary would be required to pay interim benefits. 127
Section 2002 contains curious provisions concerning remands. If
the Secretary moves for a remand before filing an answer, the
court may remand the case "for further action by an administra-
tive law judge or hearing examiner in the Administration. 1 28 Also,
the court may remand at any time under certain conditions for
"additional evidence to be taken before a hearing examiner in the
Administration. '" 12 9 The hearing examiner, in turn, is to file his de-
cision with an administrative law judge. This decision is reviewable
by the ALJ "to the same extent as the original decision and find-
ings."18s Given this language, it would appear that the "hearing ex-
aminer" in this title occupies the same position as the "hearing
officer" in Title III.
Appeals from the Social Security Court would lie in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.13' Apparently ap-
peals of stipulated cases in the federal district courts would also be
vested in the Federal Circuit. 3 2
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id. at tit. III, § 3003.
128. Id. at tit. II, § 2002. The bill reads, "The defendant, may on motion of the defend-
ant... remand the case.. ." (emphasis added). This may be an error. Presumably remand
would be made by the court on motion of the defendant.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. This is not entirely free from doubt as the proposed § 716(c) also states: "(3)
The judgment of the district court shall be final, except that it shall be subject to review in
the same manner as a judgment in other civil actions within the jurisdiction of district
courts of the United States."
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C. The Draft Justice Department Bill
The only information currently available to the author on the
draft Justice Department bill is contained in Secretary Bowen's
letter to the Office of Management and Budget of February 4,
1986.133 According to that letter, the draft bill would create a So-
cial Security Court divided into "five regional divisions each with a
chief judge and six associate judges, as well as a chief judge of the
entire court."134 The court would have "exclusive jurisdiction at
the initial stage of judicial review of virtually all actions arising
under title II or title XVI of the Social Security Act. ' 13 ' There
would be an internal mechanism designed to ensure that the deci-
sions of the various judges of the court would be "consistent and
uniform."136 "Final decisions of the [clourt would be reviewable at
the discretion of the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, but
review would be mandatory where the Secretary of Health and
Human Services certified that a case presented a question with
broad or significant implications in the administration or interpre-
tation of the social security laws. "137
IV. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR A SOCIAL SECURITY COURT
The proponents of creation of a Social Security Court offer vari-
ous justifications for their proposals. Representative Tauke, spon-
sor of the H.R. 4647, argues that:
Reforming the adjudication and appeals process for Social Secur-
ity benefit claims will end the unfairness of the current complex,
confusing, and often arbitrary system of determining eligibility,
particularly for disability benefits. The current system, with four
levels of administrative review plus judicial review by one of 94
federal district courts, one of 12 circuit courts, and the Supreme
Court, was simply not designed to handle the approximately 1.5
million disability claims decided each year. (Over 50,000 cases are
pending before the federal courts. Last year alone, 28,000 disabil-
ity cases were appealed to the courts.) Not only is the system in-
credibly expensive and time-consuming, it is disjointed and cre-
133. Bowen letter, supra note 3.
134. Id. at 1.
135. Id.
136. Id. The "council" would consist of the "chief judge of the court and of each divi-
sion, along with an associate judge from each divsion."
137. Id.
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ates rather than resolves controversies both within the
administrative process and before the courts.138
Representative Archer, Sponsor of H.R. 4419, similarly argues that
"[t]his should assure consistent, uniform, and more expert hand-
ling of court cases, and eliminates the potential for conflicting cir-
cuit court opinions.' 3 9
One of the most vocal advocates of a Social Security Court, Fred
Arner, a consultant to the SSA, has likewise emphasized that such
a court would provide "more uniform decision-making.' 140 Arguing
that a Social Security Court would "alleviate the nonacquiescence
problem," Mr. Arner has articulated the following objectives: "(1)
increased uniformity in decisionmaking by the judiciary and a con-
comitant increase in uniformity at all levels of the adjudicative
process, and (2) relief to an already overburdened federal judiciary
and a vehicle for the more effective handling of social security
cases.""4 He also argues that the SSA's policy of nonacquiescence
would be unnecessary under a Social Security Court. 42 Further,
Mr. Arner has cited the 1978 SSA-funded study of the National
Center for Administrative Justice 43 (hereinafter the Center Re-
port) for the proposition that, while Article III judges might be
superior in general intellectual ability to specialized court judges,
specialized experience may produce greater technical expertise and
heightened awareness of the potential impact of any particular de-
cision on a program. Secretary Bowen likewise has cited the bene-
fits of "uniformity and timeliness of court decisions," avoidance of
conflicts among the circuits, and improved judicial review process
because the Social Security Court judges "would become more ex-
pert in Social Security and SSI cases than district judges.""11 4 Fi-
nally, it has also been suggested that a Social Security Court might
handle cases more speedily than the federal district courts. 4 5
138. Dear Colleague Letter from Rep. Tom Tauke (April 22, 1986) (discussing H.R.
4647) (on file, Florida State University Law Review)[hereinafter Tauke Letter].
139. Dear Colleague Letter from Rep. Bill Archer (March 18, 1986) (discussing H.R.
4419)(on file, Florida State University Law Review).
140. Arner, The Social Security Court Proposal: An Answer to a Critique, 10 J. L.ais.
324, 326-327 (1983).
141. Arner, Establishing a Social Security Court - An Alternative to Nonacquiescence?,
4 DET. C.L. REV. 907, 910 (1984).
142. Id.
143. Arner, supra note 140, at 340-341 (quoting CENTER REPORT, supra note 101).
144. See Bowen letter, supra note 3, at 2.
145. Ogilivy, supra note 101, at 246.
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Thus, the purported interrelated benefits of an Article I Social
Security Court may be summarized as follows:
1. uniformity/fairness/alleviates need for nonacquiescence;
2. designed specifically for Social Security system/more expert
handling;
3. relief of overburdened federal judiciary, and
4. more effective/efficient handling of cases.
V. A CRITIQUE OF THE JUSTIFICATIONS AND THE PROPOSALS
In this section the author will examine the justifications for a
new social security court. Such justifications include uniformity,
expertise and docket congestion. The author concludes that these
justifications do not warrant creation of a new Article I Court. The
perceived difficulties with the system can more readily be solved
through return of the administrative process.
A. The Uniformity Issue
It cannot be seriously questioned that uniform decisionmaking is
a desirable, if unobtainable, goal in implementing a federal pro-
gram. Vesting judicial review in one court has a certain superficial
attraction in advancing that goal. Particularly if decisions are ap-
pealed from that court to one appellate court, uniform law would
be expected to develop. Of course, the application of such uniform
doctrines to individual cases will never be an exact science.
To justify abandoning of the current judicial review system on
this basis, one must first posit that there is substantial, unresolved
nonuniformity of decisional law on important issues among the cir-
cuits. Further, it must be posited that the SSA lacks appropriate
means of resolving these differences.
Certainly there are important issues that have been recurrently
addressed by the circuit courts: for example, allocating the burden
of proof or persuasion, 46 assessing subjective complaints, 1' 7 deter-
146. Burden of proof is initially on the claimant: Kutchman v. Cohen, 425 F.2d 20 (7th
Cir. 1970). See also Warncke v. Harris, 619 F.2d 412 (5th Cir. 1980) reh'g denied, 624 F.2d
1098 (1980); Fortenberry v. Harris, 612 F.2d 947 (5th Cir. 1980); Richardson v. Califano, 574
F.2d 802 (4th Cir. 1978); Alexander v. Weinberger, 536 F.2d 779 (8th Cir. 1976); Timmer-
man v. Weinberger, 510 F.2d 479 (8th Cir. 1975); Gaultney v. Weinberger, 505 F.2d 943 (5th
Cir. 1974); Hess v. Secretary of Health, Educ. and Welfare, 497 F.2d 837 (3rd Cir. 1974);
Trujillo v. Cohen, 304 F. Supp. 265 (D. Colo. 1969), afi'd, 429 F.2d 1149 (10th Cir. 1970);
Franklin v. Secretary of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 393 F.2d 640 (2nd Cir. 1968); Justice v.
Gardner, 360 F.2d 998 (6th Cir. 1966).
147. As noted, SSDBRA now sets forth a standard for evaluating subjective complaints,
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mining the weight to be given treating physicians' reports,""8 set-
ting standards for termination,149 and considering "non-severe"
impairments. 15 Obviously, the circuits do not always speak with
one voice on these important issues; however, they are generally in
substantial agreement. 51
Where nonuniformity on important issues exists among the cir-
cuits, there are two traditional and obvious sources of redress:
Congress and the Supreme Court. As noted above, Congress did
address certain important, vexing issues in SSDBRA, such as stan-
dards for termination, consideration of multiple complaints, and
including pain. Pub. L. No. 98-460, § 3, 98 Stat. 1794, 1799-1800 (1984) (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A) (Supp. III 1985)).
Pain resulting from a medically determinable impairment may be disabling and thus enti-
tle a claimant to disability benefits. Higginbotham v. Califano, 617 F.2d 1058, 1059 (4th Cir.
1980). Pain in itself may be a disabling condition. Baerga v. Richardson, 500 F.2d 309, 312
(3rd Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 931 (1975); see also Kirk v. Secretary of Health &
Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 957 (1983); Northcutt v.
Califano, 581 F.2d 164, 166 (8th Cir. 1978); Fitzsimmons v. Mathews, 491 F. Supp. 423, 425
(W.D. Mo. 1980), aff'd, 647 F.2d 862 (8th Cir. 1981). The subjective element of pain is an
important factor to be considered in determining disability. See Franklin v. Secretary of
Health, Educ. & Welfare, 393 F.2d 640 (2d Cir. 1968). See also Sayers v. Gardner, 380 F.2d
940, 948 (6th Cir. 1967); Mark v. Celebrezze, 348 F.2d 289, 292 (9th Cir. 1965).
148. The opinion of a treating physician is entitled to great weight. Bowman v. Heckler,
706 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1983); Carroll v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 705 F.2d 638
(2nd Cir. 1983); Wallace v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 722 F.2d 1150 (3rd Cir.
1983); Warncke v. Harris, 619 F.2d 412 (5th Cir. 1980), reh'g denied, 624 F.2d 1098; Stawls
v. Califano, 596 F.2d 1209 (4th Cir. 1979); Walston v. Gardner, 381 F.2d 580 (6th Cir. 1967);
Heslep v. Celebrezze, 356 F.2d 891 (4th Cir. 1966).
149. SSDBRA now sets forth specific standards for termination of benefits. Pub. L. No.
98-460, § 2(a) 98 Stat. 1794 (1984) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 423(f) (Supp. III 1985). The
precedents were not uniform as to these standards. Some courts held that a claimant is
entitled to a presumption of continuing disability. Rush v. Secretary of Health & Human
Servs., 738 F.2d 909 (8th Cir. 1984), vacated sub nor. Bowen v. Polaksi, 106 S. Ct. 2886
(1986); Dotson v. Schweiker, 719 F.2d 80 (4th Cir. 1983); Patti v. Schweiker, 669 F.2d 582
(9th Cir. 1982); Rivas v. Weinberger, 475 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1973). Although the Third Cir-
cuit refused to adopt this presumption and placed the initial burden of proof on the claim-
ant, it held that that burden can be met by the claimant's own testimony of continuing
disability. See Kuzmin v. Schweiker, 714 F.2d 1233, 1237 (3d Cir. 1983); Rush, 738 F.2d at
915.
150. Some courts have struck down SSA's severity regulations. Hansen v. Heckler, 783
F.2d 170 (10th Cir. 1986), Baeder v. Heckler, 768 F.2d 547 (3rd Cir. 1985); Johnson v. Heck-
ler, 769 F.2d 1202 (7th Cir. 1985); Yuckert v. Heckler, 774 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1985), cert.
granted, 106 S. Ct. 1967 (1986). Other courts have upheld the severity regulation but have
applied a de minimis standard for determining severity. See Salmi v. Secretary of Health &
Human Servs., 774 F.2d 685, 692 (6th Cir. 1985). See also Estran v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 340,
341 (5th Cir. 1984); Evans v. Heckler, 734 F.2d 1012, 1014 (4th Cir. 1984); Brady v. Heckler,
724 F.2d 914, 920 (11th Cir. 1984); Chico v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 947, 954 (2d Cir. 1983).
151. This has been a matter of public debate. See Ogilvy supra note 101, at 236 n.42;
Arner, supra note 141, at 332.
19871
24 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
evaluation of subjective impairments. Of course, the Supreme
Court often grants writs of certiorari to resolve splits among the
circuits. For example, the Court has granted the Secretary's peti-
tion for a writ of certiorari in Yuckert v. Heckler 5 ' to review the
legality of the current regulations on evaluation of non-severe
impairments.
Yuckert is instructive because, as is frequently the case, the split
is more between the Secretary and the circuits, than among the
circuits themselves. The Secretary's severity regulations have been
struck down by the Third, Seventh, Ninth and Tenth Circuits. 53
While the Sixth Circuit has upheld the challenged regulation, it
has provided an interpretation of the regulation similar to that
reached in the circuits that have held it invalid.15 4 Nevertheless,
the Secretary appropriately sought Supreme Court review of the
issue.
In other cases, the SSA's obstinate refusal to seek certiorari
where there is either a split among the circuits or when the circuits
simply all disagree with the SSA's position, perpetuates
nonuniform interpretation. Nonuniformity exists largely between
the SSA and the circuits rather than among the circuits them-
selves. The reality is that the SSA objects to relatively uniform
adverse decisions largely brought about in recent years by the
SSA's obstinance or, as in some instances described above, its
lawlessness.
The cry of nonuniformity is a smokescreen. One can only suspect
that the administration favors the establishment of the Social Se-
curity Court in the hope that such a court would abandon settled
precedent and create new precedent more favorable to the the So-
cial Security Administration.
If the SSA truly wishes to obtain a more efficient system with
more uniform results and better success on judicial review, it might
152. 774 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 1967 (1986). Only this May,
the Court granted the Secretary's petition for certiorari in Galbreath v. Bowen to review
whether Secretary to withhold attorney's fees in SSI Cases. Galbreath, 55 U.S. Law 3741
(U.S. May 5, 1987); 799 F.2d 370 (8th Cir. 1986).
153. Baeder v. Heckler, 768 F.2d 547 (3rd Cir. 1985); Johnson v. Heckler, 769 F.2d 1202
(7th Cir. 1985); Yuckert v. Heckler, 774 F.2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S.Ct.
1967 (1986); Hansen v. Heckler, 783 F.2d 170 (10th Cir. 1986).
154. Salmi v. Secretary of Health & Human Servs., 774 F.2d 685, 692 (6th Cir. 1985).
See also Estran v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 340, 341 (5th Cir. 1984); Evans v. Heckler, 734 F.2d
1012, 1014 (4th Cir. 1984); Brady v. Heckler, 724 F.2d 914, 920 (11th Cir. 1984); Chico v.
Schweiker, 710 F.2d 947, 954 (2d Cir. 1983)-all of which required only a de minimis
threshold showing of severity.
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start by correcting its own internal nonuniformity. As noted by
Representative Tauke:
At the height of the continuing disability review controversy,
SSA data disclosed that 98 percent of the disability cessation de-
terminations issued by the state agencies handling the first and
second steps of the review process were correct. Yet when the
beneficiaries appealed to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ),
more than two-thirds were put back on the disability rolls. Some-
thing was clearly wrong with the way state agencies were evaluat-
ing these claims, but the ALJ decisions had no discernible impact
on the practices of the state agencies."'
As long as the SSA clings to the myth that the state agency deter-
minations are ninety-eight percent accurate and continues to in-
struct the state agencies to nonacquiesce, it will maintain a system
of internal nonuniformity. The SSA perpetuates the problem by
refusing to recognize and implement the "corrective function of
review.''"15
Whatever the theoretical justifications for nonacquiescence as
practiced by the SSA, a systemic need for such nonacquiescence
based on nonuniformity simply does not withstand scrutiny. Since
the judicial rulings to which the SSA objects are normally the ones
it has lost, the decision to seek certiorari lies with the administra-
tion. No change in the structure of judicial review is necessary to
remedy the nonuniform precedent as currently exists. It is neces-
sary for the administration to file for certiorari in appropriate
cases.
The argument for a Social Security Court premised on
nonuniformity can only stand if the SSA can demonstrate that the
Supreme Court has denied its requests for certiorari in a signifi-
cant number of cases in which splits exist among the circuits on
important Social Security issues. Currently, no such showing has
been made.
B. Article I or Article III Judges?
Curiously, none of the published justifications for the Social Se-
curity Court proposal explain the supposed advantages of estab-
lishing such a court under Article I of the Constitution, instead of
under Article III. Assuming that the justifications set forth above
155. See Tauke Letter, supra note 138, at 1.
156. CENTER REPORT, supra note 101, at 137-139.
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are realistic and desirable and that a Social Security Court is the
way to obtain them, it remains unclear why it should be an Article
I court. Ironically, Representative Tauke, seeking cosponsors for
H.R. 4647, asserted that the bill would result in "depoliticizing"
the Social Security Administration.15 7 Even proponents of the So-
cial Security Court have acknowledged the need to assure the inde-
pendence of its judges.158 Mr. Arner has suggested extending the
proposed term of the judges from ten to fifteen years, the same as
exists for Tax Court judges.1 59
The recent history of the Social Security Administra-
tion-replete with uncontested findings of improper pressure to
deny benefits placed upon physicians and those administrative law
judges who grant benefits "too often"-emphasizes the critical
need for truly independent judicial review. Replacing Article III
lifetime tenure judges with Article I judges hardly advances this
independence. Varying the proposed term length of Article I
judges may have some effect on the sense of independence of these
judges, but it cannot provide the independence intended for Arti-
cle III judges.160 All of the perceived benefits of a Social Security
Court surely could be obtained by staffing such a court with Article
III judges, without the detriment of diminished independence.
If the Social Security Court judges are not Article III judges,
they become, essentially, another set of administrative law judges
superimposed over the ALJs who hear the administrative cases. If
they are not to duplicate the function of the ALJs, and are to pro-
vide judicial review, they should be Article III judges. If they are
not to provide judicial review their purpose is unclear.
157. See Tauke letter, supra note 138.
158. See CENTER REPORT, supra note 101, at 150.
159. Arner, supra note 140, at 342.
160. See THE FEDERALIST, No. 78 at 103. (L. Dekoster ed. 1976), which states:
If, then, the courts of justice are to be considered as bulwarks of a limited Con-
stitution against legislative encroachments, this consideration will afford a strong
argument for the permanent tenure of judicial offices, since nothing will contrib-
ute so much as this to that independent spirit in the judges which must be essen-
tial to the faithful performance of so arduous a duty.
This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard the Constitution
and the rights of individuals from the effects of those ill humors which the arts of
designing men, or the influence of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate
among the people themselves, and which, though they speedily give place to better
information, and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the meantime, to
occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and serious oppressions of the
minor party in the community.
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C. Matters of Expertise
The Social Security Court judges, however constituted, suppos-
edly would gain increased expertise over district court judges in
handling Social Security cases, thereby benefitting the system. It is
clear that judges who exclusively address one area of the law gain
enhanced expertise in that area; however, it is less clear what bene-
fit will derive from an incremental gain in expertise. To posit a
significant systemic gain, one must assume a lack of expertise on
the part of sitting federal district judges. This is not only insulting
to the bench, but is belied by the statistics. As of the spring of
1986, over 50,000 disability cases were pending in federal court,
28,000 of which were filed in 1985 alone.61 Although cases fre-
quently are referred to a United States magistrate to make an ini-
tial report, usually it falls to the district judge to review these re-
ports and rule on exceptions. Therefore, the number of cases
reviewed, either initially or after a magistrate's report, by a typical
federal judge is quite large. For proponents of a Social Security
Court to argue that federal district judges are on the one hand
overwhelmed by Social Security cases and on the other hand lack
expertise in handling them is contradictory. Furthermore, this ra-
tionale relates to the SSA's underlying problems. It assumes that
where the SSA is reversed, the decision of the federal judge is
"wrong" and the administrative decision below is "right." This, of
course, is one underlying premise behind the assumption of the
ninety-eight percent accuracy rate at the initial determination
level and behind nonacquiescence.
D. Meaningful Change in the Administrative System
Unquestionably, creation of a Social Security Court would re-
lieve sitting federal district judges of a significant portion of their
dockets but it would do so at the expense of establishing a whole
new judicial system to shoulder the burden. To truly relieve ex-
isting strain on judicial review, the SSA should improve its admin-
istrative decisionmaking. All too often, reconsideration and the
Appeals Council Review are hollow exercises in rubber-stamping
161. Tauke Letter, supra note 138 at 1. While the figures vary somewhat depending on
the source, there can be little question that these numbers are fairly accurate. The Depart-
ment of Health & Human Services Office of General Counsel reported 20,016 filings in fiscal
year 1985. Operational Report of the Office of Hearings and Appeals, Sept. 30, 1985, re-
printed in 8 NAT'L SOC SEC. CLAimANTs REPS. Soc. SEC. F., May 1986, at 9. See also R
POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS CRISIS & REFORM 83 (1985).
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and delay. The Center Report- found that with regard to the Ap-
peals Council "[tihe most distinctive feature of judicial review in
the disability area is ... the high proportion of cases that result in
a remand for further administrative proceedings . ...,, The
Secretary is given an unqualified privilege to retract before he files
an answer those decisions he does not want to defend. This privi-
lege is exercised by the Secretary in one out of every eight disabil-
ity cases filed, which accounts for more than forty percent of all
remands.
One of the allegedly overburdened circuit judges, Judge Posner
of the Seventh Circuit, has added this observation:
I have read many administrative law judges' decisions in social
security disability cases, all of which the disappointed applicant
has asked the Appeals Council to review (as he had to do, before
he could begin judicial review proceedings), but I can remember
only one occasion on which the Appeals Council wrote an opinion,
even when the administrative law judge's decision raised difficult
questions.163
Judge Posner has suggested that it would be easier and cheaper for
Congress to create at the Appeals Council level a tier of credible
appellate administrative judges who would write opinions in all but
frivolous cases.'4
The burden on the federal courts will not be ameliorated by
switching that burden to a new court while keeping the current
administrative system essentially intact, with different standards
at different levels and often perfunctory review at the highest ad-
ministrative level. Meaningful administrative reform would cer-
tainly lessen the burden on any judicial review system.
E. Expediting Judicial Review
It is suggested that a Social Security Court will expedite judicial
review of cases. No doubt this, too, is a consummation devoutly to
be desired. One must question how this can be possible while pro-
viding the touted expert review. As noted by the sponsors of H.R.
400, there are now 531 federal district judges to review Social Se-
162. CENTER REPORT, supra note 101, at 150.
163. POSNER, supra note 161, at 161.
164. Id.
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curity cases. 115 Frequently the initial judicial review is performed
by a United States magistrate to whom the district court refers the
matter.1" In some instances, by consent of the parties, the magis-
trate actually renders the final decision at the district court
level.16 There are now nearly as many United States magistrates
as federal district judges,1" totaling approximately 1,000 federal
district judges and magistrates.
Exactly how twenty to thirty-six full time Social Security Court
judges will be able to handle some 55,000 Social Security cases on
judicial review more efficiently than the existing bench remains
somewhat mysterious. No doubt they will, to some extent, rely
upon their law clerks as do the district judges and magistrates.
Still the numbers seem overwhelming. One can readily imagine
these judges being forced by the sheer number of cases to abdicate
their authority and duties to unappointed, unconfirmed "analysts,"
such as those who now perform a similar function within the Ap-
peals Council. The price of expedition and expertise would surely
be a superficial, hit-or-miss judicial review process.
F. Appeal to the Federal Circuit
Finally, it is difficult to perceive the benefit of vesting all appeals
from the proposed Social Security Court in the United States
Court for the Federal Circuit. This specialized appellate court was
created out of a merger of the Court of Claims and the Court of
Customs and Patent Appeals. Unlike the other circuit courts, its
jurisdiction is defined by subject matter, not geography.1 69 More-
over, the workload of the Federal Circuit is considerably heavier
than was anticipated when it was created in 1982. Some 2500 ap-
peals are now docketed annually. 17 0 Whereas the proposed Social
Security Court would hear nothing but Social Security cases, for
the Federal Circuit these cases would be an additional burden to
the existing caseload. This one circuit court would be expected to
do the work now being performed by twelve circuit courts. With its
165. See Dear Colleague letter from Reps. T. Luken & D. Glickman (Mar. 21, 1986) at 1
(on file, Florida State University Law Review).
166. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1982).
167. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) (1982).
168. See POSNER, supra note 161, at 97.
169. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292(c)-(d), 1295 (1982). The jurisdiction of the United States Court
for the Federal Circuit is trade, government contracts, patents, tax, claims for money from
the government, and disputes between federal agencies and their civil service employees.
170. Murphy & Plaschkes, A Portrait of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, 33 FED. BAR NEws & J. 125 (1986).
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already full docket, it is difficult to perceive how the Federal Cir-
cuit can be expected to handle Social Security appeals from all
over the United States expeditiously and thoroughly.
Additionally, exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal Circuit based
in Washington, D.C. will cause great difficulty or hardship for
claimants seeking or required to argue their cases. Frequently,
these claimants are indigent, and often are represented by legal
services or legal aid attorneys. Absent provision for the Federal
Circuit judges to "ride the circuits," claimants will be placed at
extreme disadvantage in arguing appeals. This can hardly promote
fairness.
The answer to the high number of Social Security cases appealed
to the federal courts and the high rates of reversal and remand is
for the Social Security Administration to cure itself by examining
its own procedures and standards critically, and not assuming
blindly that it is initially correct ninety-eight percent of the time,
while it is the review system that is erroneous. It is the administra-
tive process, not the judicial review process, that is in need of seri-
ous reform. The Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act
was an ambitious first step toward the reform mandated by Con-
gress. Indeed, while SSA may be marching to Thoreau's different
drummer, one suspects that it is more akin to our little Johnnie
with whom everyone else is out of step.
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